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Recent Development

International Trade Law and the

Arbitration of Administrative Law Matters:
Farrel Corp. v. U.S. International
Trade Commission
RONALD A. BRAND*
I.

INTRODUCTION

With support from the executive branch, Congress, and the
courts, arbitration has become an increasingly popular method of
international dispute resolution. While agreements to arbitrate
traditionally were frowned upon, particularly when the dispute
involved certain "public law" or "statutory" matters, the situation has
changed dramatically in the past few decades. United States courts
now routinely order arbitration of disputes implicating important
policy issues in securities, antitrust, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO"), and employment law matters.' By the end
of the 1980's, the presence of a public or "statutory" issue seemed no
longer to be a distinguishing factor; arbitration, when selected by the
parties in a binding agreement, would be the method of dispute
settlement.
Just as most legal trends meet with limitations, this liberal
enforcement of arbitration agreements was rejected by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Farrel Corp. v.
United States InternationalTrade Commission.2 The Farrelopinion
is founded upon an administrative law distinction drawn from a single
sentence dictum of the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson

* Professor of Law, Univ. of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
2. 949 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1947 (1992).
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Lane Corp.3 The Federal Circuit used this distinction to justify its
refusal to compel arbitration in Farrel,reversing an administrative
body's decision to terminate adjudication in the face of an arbitration
agreement between private parties. 4 The court rejected the argument
that a contract clause calling for the arbitration of "all disputes arising
in connection with the present Agreement," required that the
International Trade Commission terminate an investigation conducted
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ("Section 337").5
The Farrel decision is troubling for those who believe contracting parties should have unlimited autonomy to select arbitration
as a forum for dispute settlement in international transactions.
Disputes arising from commercial and investment transactions are
increasingly likely to include the intellectual property rights issues
dealt with under Section 337. Thus, the limitations of the Farrel
decision could have a significant impact on international trade.
While the Federal Circuit in Farrel focuses on the dispute
settlement process, the result also raises substantive international trade
law concerns. The court failed to consider either United States
commitments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), 6 or the rule of construction presuming statutory consistency with such international obligations.' These failures exacerbate the
existing problem of bringing Section 337 into compliance with article

3. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991); see infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
4. 949 F.2d at 1156.
5. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 703-04 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)).
Section 337(a)(1) declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles," and the importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable
United States patent, copyright, process patent, trademark or semi-conductor chip mask work.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)-(D). For a brief description of Section 337 purposes and
procedures, see infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 4

GATT, BASIC

INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS,

TEXT OF THE GENERAL

1969 (1969), 61 Stat. A5, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATIT].
7. "Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text; see also
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains .... ). But 4 RESTATEMENT, supra, § 114 cmt. a ('The principle of
interpretation in this section is influenced by the fact that the courts are obliged to give effect
to a federal statute even if it is inconsistent with a pre-existing rule of international law or
with a provision of an international agreement of the United States.").
AGREEMENT
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111:4 of the GATr,8 as is required by the panel report adopted by the
GATT Contracting Parties in November 1989. 9
Farrelcompels further consideration of the relationship among
private dispute settlement arrangements, national laws governing
international trade, and sovereign international trade obligations. This
commentary begins by reviewing the background of U.S. law
regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements, against which the
Farreldecision must be considered. It then addresses Farrel'seffect
on substantive trade law issues. Finally, it concludes that Farrel
raises serious concerns about U.S. compliance with GATT obligations
and U.S. courts' future practice in dealing with those obligations.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY FAVORING EN-

FORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS'

°

Congress originally enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in
1925" to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements ... [and] to allow parties to a dispute to avoid 'the
costliness and delays of litigation,' and to place arbitration agreements
'upon the same footing as other contracts .... ,,,12 The Act was
8. Article 11:4, the basic national treatment (non-discrimination) provision of the
GATT, states in part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATT, supra note 6, art. mI:4.
9. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 345, 396 (36th Supp.
1990) [hereinafter Panel Report]; see infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text. While the
Office of the United States Trade Representative has considered alternatives for bringing
Section 337 in line with GATr obligations, Congress has not yet passed such legislation.
See USTR Proposes Changes in U.S. PatentEnforcement System Under Section 337, INT'L

TRADE REP. (BNA), Feb. 7, 1990, at 184.
10. Portions of this section are developed from the author's earlier discussion in Ronald
A. Brand, Nonconvention Issues in the Preparationof TransnationalSales Contracts,8 J.L.
& COM. 145, 158-64 (1988).

11. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
12. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924)). Section 2 of the Act provides that a written
agreement to arbitrate a commercial dispute, "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). To accomplish this goal, the Act provides for a stay of proceedings in
a case where the issue before a court is arbitrable under the agreement, and directs the
federal courts to order parties to arbitrate if there has been a "failure, neglect or refusal" of
a party to honor an agreement to arbitrate. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988). The Act further
provides for the enforcement of arbitral awards once rendered by allowing judgment to be
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reenacted
and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States
13
Code.
The goals of the Arbitration Act were furthered in the international setting by the 1958 United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New
York Convention"), which entered into force in the United States on
December 29, 1970.14 Article II of the Convention obligates the
courts in each contracting state to "recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.""5
The Convention further requires that each contracting state recognize
any award rendered in another contracting state as binding16 and
enforce the award just as if it had been rendered domestically.
The concept of arbitrability under article I(1) of the New York
Convention "relates to public golicy limitations upon arbitration as a
method of settling disputes."
Each state tends to apply its own
public policy
considerations
to
determine the scope of arbitrable
18
matters.
entered upon the award. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
13. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669.
14. Done at New York June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
New York Convention]. The Convention was implemented in the United States through the
Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (1988 & Supp. m 1991)). The text of the Convention can be found immediately
following 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1993 Supp.).
15. New York Convention, supranote 14, art. 11(1). "The term 'agreement to arbitrate'
shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties
or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams." Id. art. 11(2).
16. I. art. 11.
17. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 137 (2d ed. 1991). The New York Convention makes no
explicit distinction that would exclude certain matters from being "capable of settlement by
arbitration." New York Convention, supra note 14, art. II(1). However, any contracting
state is permitted to "declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out
of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under
the national law of the State making such declaration." Ia art. 1(3). This reservation has
been availed of by about one third of the contracting states. See generally MARTINDALEHUBBELL LAW DIGEST, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGESTS IC/12-15 (1992) (reproducing the
texts of the various reservations).
18. The New York Convention allows refusal of recognition and enforcement of an
award if the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable under the law of the state in which
enforcement is sought. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V(2)(a). For a discussion
of varying national approaches to the concept of arbitrability, see REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 17, at 137-47.
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In the United States, respect for party autonomy in the selection
of a forum for dispute settlement underlies the law on arbitration. In
the seminal case of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,19 the

Supreme Court enforced a choice-of-forum clause in a contract
between U.S. and German parties calling for litigation in London."
The Bremen generated subsequent decisions enforcing choice-offorum provisions generally, but at the same time including dicta
suggesting exceptions to enforcement. These exceptions can be
categorized as those cases (1) where enforcement of the provision
would result in substantial inconvenience, or denial of an effective
remedy"; (2) where there has been fraud, overreaching, or unconscionable conduct in contract relations2; and (3) where enforcement
would result in a violation of public policy or the transaction is

19. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
20. The Court noted that "[t]he expansion of American business and industry will hardly
be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts." ld. at 9.
21. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17-18. But c. id. at 16 ("[W]here it can be said with
reasonable assurance that at the time they entered the contract, the parties to a freely
negotiated private international commercial agreement contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such claim of inconvenience should be heard to render
the forum clause unenforceable.").
This is basically the doctrine of forum non conveniens. However, it is important
to note that courts have found that the existence of a valid forum-selection clause does not
prevent a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a):
Congress set down in § 1404(a) the factors it thought should be decisive on
a motion for transfer. Only one of these-the convenience of the parties-is
properly within the power of the parties themselves to affect by a forumselection clause. The other factors-the convenience of witnesses and the
interest of justice--are third party or public interests that must be weighed
by the district court; they cannot be automatically outweighed by the
existence of a purely private agreement between the parties. Such an
agreement does not obviate the need for analysis of the factors set forth in
§ 1404(a) and does not necessarily preclude the granting of the motion to
transfer.
Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757-58 (3d Cir. 1973).
22. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. The Supreme Court further developed the fraud
exception in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., when it stated:
This qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of a
transaction is based upon an allegation of fraud ...the clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that [a] ...forum-selection clause in a contract is not
enforceable if the inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of

fraud or coercion.
417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974) (emphasis in original).
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otherwise unfair, unjust or unreasonable.' Despite their repetition
as dicta, these exceptions rarely are applied. 24
U.S. courts have said they would recognize analogous exceptions
to enforcement of arbitration clauses, although neither the Federal
Arbitration Act nor the New York Convention subjects the obligation
to enforce to such defenses?2 But like the exceptions to choice-offorum enforcement, such exceptions appear only in dicta and seldom,
if ever, produce judicial refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement. 26 The Act has been construed to permit a defense of fraud or
illegality in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself as a defense
to enforcement of arbitration, but any question as to fraud or illegality
in the inducement of the contract as a whole is an issue for the
arbitrator and cannot be raised as a defense to enforcement of the
arbitration clause. 27

23. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. The Court rejected Zapata's argument that the
exculpatory clause contained in the agreement violated U.S. public policy. Id. at 15-16.
24. Commentators enumerate these exceptions in different ways. See, e.g., Ann E.
Covey & Michael S. Morris, The Enforceability of Agreements Providingfor Forum and
Choice of Law Selection, 61 DENY. L.. 837, 842 (1984) ("The primary limitations ... are
fraud, public policy, adhesion, statutory restrictions and inconvenience of the contractual
forum."); Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate
CommercialAgreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 163-85 (dividing the exceptions into the
categories of (1)fraud, (2) bargaining relationship between the parties, (3) nature of the
selected forum, (4) public policy of the forum, (5) statutory restrictions on forum-selection
clauses, (6) inconvenience of the contractual forum and (7) other instances of unreasonableness).
25. The New York Convention does provide that recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award may be refused if the party against whom it is invoked can prove that (1) the
parties were either under a legal incapacity when the agreement was made or the agreement
itself was invalid, (2) proper notice was not given in the arbitration proceedings, (3) the
award deals with matters not within the terms of the submission to arbitration or beyond its
scope, (4) the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement
to arbitrate, or (5) the award is not yet binding on the parties in the country in which it was
rendered. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V(1). These are defenses to the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Nothing in the Convention provides for
defenses to an action to compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the parties.
26. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)
(sustaining an arbitration clause, but opining that "[o]f course, courts should remain attuned
to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any
contract.' 9 U.S.C. § 2.").
27. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
n.1 1 (1984); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606,
610 (2d Cir. 1969); Hashemi v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 642 F. Supp.
376, 380 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Todd v. Oppenheimer & Co., 78 F.R.D. 415, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 597 P.2d 380, 382 (Wash. 1979).
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U.S. courts long held that certain matters of important public
policy, such as antitrust claims,28 securities law claims,29 employment law claims, 30 and claims under RICO, 31 could not be decided
by arbitration and must be submitted to the courts. More recent
decisions, however, particularly in the international setting, have
consistently held that even such "public" or "statutory" law concerns
may be entrusted to arbitration.32
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 33 the Supreme Court, relying

heavily on the language of The Bremen, encountered a contract clause
providing that "any controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this
agreement or breach thereof' be submitted to arbitration before the
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.3
In its earlier
35
decision in Wilko v. Swan, the Court had declined to order
arbitration of issues arising under section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933. Despite this precedent, in Scherk the Court ordered
arbitration of the dispute between the parties, including a claim of
securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The Court acknowledged that it could have based its decision
on the difference in policies between the 1933 and 1934 Acts, but
instead relied on the distinction that the contract in Scherk was "a
truly international agreement." 36 The Court recognized that "[a]
contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which
disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is... an almost
28. See, e.g., American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1968); see also Thomas E. Johnson, International Antitrust Litigation and

Arbitration Clauses, 3 J.L. & CoM. 91, 97 (1983). But see Francis J. Higgins et al., Pitfalls
in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 35 Bus. LAW. 1035, 1040 (1980).

29. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953).
30. See, e.g., Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07
(8th Cir. 1988) (Title VII claim not subject to arbitration).
31. See, e.g., Page v. Mosley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291,
298-99 (1st Cir. 1986).
32. Public regulation of prices and shipping arrangements by administrative agencies,
however, cannot be avoided by an arbitration clause. A/S Ivarans Rederi v. United States,
938 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Federal Maritime Commission jurisdiction over administration of international rate and transport allocation agreement displaced arbitration clause in
contract between private carriers); Duke Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 864
F.2d 823, 829-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (arbitration provision in interconnection agreement
between power companies that was filed with FERC did not prevent FERC from exercising
jurisdiction to enforce violation of a filed rate schedule); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1977).
33. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
34. Id. at 508.
35. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
36. 417 U.S. at 513-15.
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indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness ' 37
and
predictability essential to any international business transaction.
38 further eviscerMitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
ated any remaining uncertainty regarding the arbitrability of "public
law" matters.39 The Supreme Court disallowed antitrust defenses
asserted by a Puerto Rican auto dealer whom a Swiss joint venture
between U.S. and Japanese parties had sued in federal district court
to compel arbitration in Japan. 4°
The Mitsubishi decision recognized that U.S. courts of appeals,
following American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire &
Co., 41 "uniformly had held that the rights conferred by the antitrust
laws were 'of a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration."' 42 It concluded, however, that "concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we
enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result
would be forthcoming in a domestic context."'4 3
With its 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,' the Supreme Court once again reaffirmed its consistent and
pervasive position favoring arbitration, even in areas of the law

37. Id. at 516.
38. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
39. For examples of past cases denying arbitration of public law matters, see supra
notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
40. 473 U.S. at 628-40.
41. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
42. 473 U.S. at 621 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F. 439,444 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd,346
U.S. 427 (1953)).
43. Id. at 629. This focus on the facilitation of international commerce brought with
it the reiteration of the Court's recognition in Scherk that refusal to enforce an international
arbitration agreement would "damagb the fabric of international commerce and trade, and
imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial
agreements." Id. at 631 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17
(1974)). Although the Mitsubishi Court acknowledged the risks of submitting statutory U.S.
antitrust issues to Japanese arbitrators in Japan, it expressed confidence in the ability of the
parties and of the arbitral body they had agreed upon to select arbitrators to apply U.S.
antitrust law ably. 473 U.S. at 634. It found the ultimate safeguard in the New York
Convention's reservation to each contracting state of the right to refuse enforcement of an
award where the "recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country." Id. at 638 (quoting the New York Convention, supra note 14, art.
V(2)(b)).
44. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
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traditionally considered to involve important issues of public
policy.45 Gilmer held that a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") can be subject to compulsory
arbitration when the parties have signed a valid agreement to
arbitrate. The Court made clear that a statutory claim distinction
would not be a foundation for denying arbitration. 47 Noting that
"the burden is on [the party objecting to arbitration] to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA
claims, 48 Justice White reiterated the Court's earlier language that
"questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration." 49
While acknowledging that "the ADEA is designed not only to
address individual grievances, but also to further important social
policies,"50 the Gilmer court used the language of Mitsubishi to note
that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function. 51
Finally, Justice White rejected the argument that arbitration of ADEA
claims would undermine the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in enforcing the ADEA: "An individual
ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free
to file a charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able
to institute a private judicial action."5" This single sentence became
the foundation for the Federal Circuit's refusal to enforce arbitration
of a claim under Section 337 in Farrel.

45. In the time between the Mitsubishi and Gilmer decisions, the Supreme Court had
continued its trend favoring arbitration of "public law" or "statutory" matters. See Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
46. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634

(1988 & Supp. 111990)).
47. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1652.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.

1, 24 (1982)).
50. Id.
at 1653.
51. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637

(1985)).
52. Id. The logic of Gilmer has been extended to Title VII claims under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in at least four circuits. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971
F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
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I1. FARREL CORP. V. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION:

ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR A BROAD POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION

Farrel Corporation, a U.S. rubber and plastics manufacturer,
licensed a competing Italian corporation, Pomini Farrel S.p.A., to use
Farrel's technology in the manufacture of machines to mix rubber and
plastics. Pomini was authorized to sell the machines worldwide,
except in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
Successive license contracts contained the following arbitration
clause:
All disputes arising in connection with the present
Agreement shall be finally settled by arbitration. Arbitration shall be conducted in Geneva, Switzerland, in
accordance with the rules of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce.
Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in
any Court having jurisdiction, or application may be made
to such Court for a judicial acceptance of the
53 award and an
order of enforcement, as the case may be.
On January 1, 1986, Farrel terminated the license agreement.
Approximately seven months later, Pomini announced plans to market
the mixing machines in the U.S. Farrel filed actions in Italy,
Scotland, and the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, claiming violation of intellectual property rights.5 4
The district court granted Pomini's motion to dismiss, holding that the
claims must be submitted to an International Chamber of Commerce
arbitration panel. 5
Meanwhile, Farrel filed a Section 337 complaint against Pomini
with the International Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Commission"),
alleging trade secret misappropriation, trademark infringement, and
misrepresentation of source of manufacture. Farrel sought an
exclusion order forbidding entry into the U.S. of Pomini's mixing
devices. In October of 1990, an administrative law judge determined
that the investigation should be terminated in light of (1) the
existence of the arbitration clauses in the technology licensing
agreements; (2) the Commission's previous decision in In re Certain

53. Farrel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 949 F.2d 1147, 1149 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1947 (1992).
54. Id. at 1149.
55. Farrel Corp. v. Pomini, Inc., No. C88-2161A (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 1990); see
Farrel,949 F.2d at 1150.
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FluidizedBed Combustion Systems,56 which terminated an investigation because an arbitration agreement existed between the parties; and
(3) the preclusive effect of the Ohio district court dismissal. 7
Upon review, the ITC affirmed the administrative law judge's
decision to terminate the investigation. 8 The Commission based its
decision on Mitsubishi and the federal policy favoring enforcement of
arbitration agreements. 59 It deemed compelling arbitration appropriate since the "claim of trade secret misappropriation [was] 'inextricably connected to the license agreement,"' and there existed no "legal
constraints external to the parties' agreement which foreclose[d]
arbitration." 6
Section 337 authorizes the ITC to deal with the importation and
sale of articles that infringe valid U.S. intellectual property rights,6 '
and unfair methods of competition or unfair acts in the importation
of any articles into the U.S., or in their sale, if they tend to destroy
or substantially injure a U.S. industry, prevent the establishment of
such an industry, or restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the
U.S. 62 Section 337 provides that "[t]he Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath or
upon its initiative."'6 3 The Farrel court considered this language
imperative, stating that "where 'the directions of a statute are
mandatory, then strict compliance with the statutory terms is essential
to the validity of the administrative action'."64
The court agreed with Farrel Corporation that "the language of
section 337 is clear: Once the Commission begins a section 337
investigation, section 337(c) authorizes termination of the investigation only in limited and specific circumstances-after its entry of a
consent order or approval of a settlement agreement between the
parties," or when the matter is based solely on alleged acts within the

56. USITC Pub. 1752, Inv. No. 337-213 (Sept. 1985) [hereinafter Fluidized Bed].
57. Farrel,949 F.2d at 1150.
58. In re Certain Internal Mixing Devices and Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-317 (ITC Nov. 3, 1990) [hereinafter Mixing Devices].
59. Id. at 6 (citing Mitsubishi Motors v.Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
60. Mixing Devices, supra note 58, at 8 (quoting Fluidized Bed, supra note 56, at 5).
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988).

62. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
63. § 1337(b)(1).
64. Farrel,949 F.2d at 1153 (quoting 1 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 4.18 (4th ed. 1985)).
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purview of the countervailing duty and antidumping laws. 6 Finding
these to be the only congressionally authorized exceptions to reaching
a conclusion as to whether a violation exists, the court determined
that termination in deference to arbitration would constitute the
inappropriate creation of "an additional and inconsistent statutory
exception."'
In an intellectual property infringement case before a U.S.
district court, it is the court's role to determine whether infringement
occurred. However, the court may dismiss or suspend proceedings
upon the equitable defense that an agreement to arbitrate exists
between the parties. 67 The Commission argued in Farrel that the
situation was no different under its authority. Thus, because Section
337(c) provides that "[a]ll legal and equitable defenses may be
presented in all cases,"6 8 the Commission, like the district court in
its decision in the Farrel/Pomini dispute, could dismiss based upon a
prior agreement between the parties to arbitrate. The Farrelcourt,
however, interpreted the statute otherwise, finding that "[w]hile the
statute does require the Commission to consider defenses, nowhere in
the text does language appear permitting termination of an investigation without concluding, as section 337(c) commands, whether a
violation exists. 69 Ultimately, the court decided that to allow
termination because of an arbitration agreement, "before the public

65. 949 F.2d at 1152 & n.5. The court specifically declined to address "whether the
ITC has authority to terminate an investigation where the complaint is withdrawn before the
ITC concludes an investigation," or "whether the rTC could terminate an investigation where
the issue becomes moot." Id. The court also refused to decide "whether the Commission
may refuse to initiate an investigation on the basis of the existence of a contractual
arbitration agreement between the parties." Id. at 1153 n.6 (emphasis supplied).
66. Id. at 1153.
67. The Farrelcourt cited cases acknowledging the equitable defense of an arbitration
agreement: Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 452
(1935) ("the special defense [of] setting up the arbitration agreement is an equitable
defense"); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1968) (upholding assertion of
defense of arbitration). Farrel,949 F.2d at 1153 n.7.
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988).
69. Farrel,949 F.2d at 1153-54 (emphasis in original).
Clearly, a defense asserted under the "all defenses" provision would allow
the Commission to find that no violation exists or to temper any relief
ultimately granted, but neither the plain language of the statute nor the
legislative history suggests that any defense raised should excuse the
Commission from making any determination whatsoever. The report of the
Senate Finance Committee states "section 337(c) ... requires that the
Commission determine whether there is a violation of this section in each
investigation it conducts."
Id. at 1154 (citations omitted) (alterations and emphasis supplied by the court).
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interest can be considered, turns the purpose of section 337 on its
head." 70
A.

Section 337 Settlement Agreements and Agreements to
Arbitrate

Several aspects of the Farrelanalysis are notable in light of the
broad, existing policy favoring arbitration. First, as noted above, a
Section 337 proceeding may be terminated upon a settlement
agreement among the parties.I The court at no point discussed the
similarity between such a settlement agreement and a pre-existing
agreement to arbitrate, which is merely another sort of private
agreement on the method by which a settlement will be reached.
While the ITC is required to publish notice of the initial decision
to terminate based upon a settlement agreement, the final decision to
terminate belongs to the Commission.72 If the Commission determines that the agreement between the parties is appropriate, a
termination order is appropriate, and "need not constitute a determination as to violation of section 337.,73 An agreement to settle the
dispute by submission to arbitration is no less a "settlement agreement" than is a final agreement; it simply requires that the final terms
be determined by a mutually acceptable third party.74 While the
Commission may not have a final opportunity to review the precise
substance of the ensuing decision, this alone is insufficient reason to

70. Md
71. The Commission shall determine, with respect to each investigation
conducted by it under this section, whether or not there is a violation of
this section, except that the Commission may, by issuing a consent order
or on the basis of a settlement agreement, terminate any such investigation, in whole or in part, without making such a determination....
19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988).
72. 19 C.F.R. § 210.51(b)(2) (1993).
73. 1&
74. It could perhaps be argued that a decision terminating because of a settlement
agreement in final resolution of a dispute differs from a termination based on an agreement
to submit the dispute to arbitration. This argument, however, would ignore the Federal
Arbitration Act and New York Convention , which treat agreements to arbitrate and final
awards as equally enforceable. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. Either way,
the Commission has the final decision on termination. The important point is that in either
case the 1TC acts consistently with the decision of the parties concerning the method for
achieving the resolution of the dispute.
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forego all the advantages that accompany a consistent policy of
enforcing arbitration clauses.75
The Farrelcourt itself does not justify distinguishing agreements
to arbitrate from other settlement agreements, and for giving the
former less weight under Section 337. Under either type of arrangement, the private parties have found a mutually satisfactory method
of ending the dispute. The court in Farrelgives no explanation for
respecting one type of agreement and not the other.
B.

Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate and ArbitralAwards

In an earlier case, Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States
International Trade Commission,76 the Federal Circuit held that the
ITC in a Section 337 proceeding could consider the res judicata effect
of a judicial ruling regarding patent infringement. Just as a second
judicial proceeding would be precluded, the court found "no reason
that the Commission must devote time and attention to that matter." 77 Thus, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the ITC could
terminate a Section 337 proceeding when presented with a court's
decision on the same matter. In Farrel,however, the Federal Circuit
rejected the argument from Young Engineersand other prior decisions
of its own and of the Supreme Court that Section 337 compelled the
Commission to terminate the action because the parties had agreed to
submit the dispute to arbitration. It ruled instead that the statute
forbade termination.
The result in Farrelis inconsistent with the Farrelcourt's own
discussion of Young Engineers. The court distinguished Young
Engineers, where another forum had already rendered a decision,
from the case at bar, where there was as yet merely an agreement to
submit to another forum. According to the court, "[w]hat the
Commission fails to recognize, however, is that no arbitral award had
yet been made in this case against which res judicata could have
applied."7" Thus the court clearly implied that a final arbitration
award would be treated the same as a judicial decision, requiring
termination of a Section 337 action on a res judicata rationale.
75. The Supreme Court has noted these advantages, and expressed confidence that the
arbitral process can be relied on to apply U.S. statutes capably. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 631, 634 (1985). For an outline of the Supreme Court's
own pro-arbitration policy, see supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
76. 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 1315.
78. Farrel,949 F.2d at 1154.
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If Young Engineers is correct in finding that a Section 337
action should be terminated when a court has already decided the
issue between the parties, and Farrelis correct in implying that ITC
termination would also result from the res judicata effect of a prior
arbitral award, then the structure of U.S. arbitration law compels that
termination should result when the parties have agreed to submit the
matter to binding arbitration.
Both the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention
embody a clear policy to respect and enforce both agreements to
arbitrate and the resulting arbitral awards. There is no policy
distinction made in either the Act or the Convention that would
justify the different treatment established by the Farrelcourt. To the
contrary, the Act and the Convention aim to make both agreements
to arbitrate and prior arbitral decisions enforceable. Therefore, if, as
the Farrel court implied, a prior arbitration award would provide
grounds for termination of ITC action under Section 337, then it
follows that an agreement between the parties to submit the issue to
arbitration should be treated no differently.
It makes little sense to respect the result of the parties' choice
of dispute resolution forum and not grant the same level of respect to
the parties' choice of the forum at the outset. The Federal Arbitration
Act and the New York Convention form a pattern of parallel respect
for, and recognition of, both the choice to arbitrate and the results of
arbitration. Any divergence from this pattern of respect at least
merits explanation beyond that provided by the court in Farrel.
C.

Gilmer and the Farrel Court's Administrative Agency/Court
Distinction

The Farrelcourt also addressed the line of Supreme Court cases
culminating in Mitsubishi79 , which favors enforcement of arbitration
agreements even when the dispute involves the application of antitrust
and other "public law.""0 It found the Federal Arbitration Act to be
directed mainly at judicial recognition of arbitration areements,
noting that "[t]he Commission, of course, is not a court." ' By this
reasoning, Section 337, which is administered exclusively by the ITC,
should not be interpreted to conform to the Arbitration Act's proarbitration policy. The Farrelcourt deemed this distinction between

79. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
81. 949 F.2d at 1155.
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courts and administrative agencies to be particularly important in
considering how arbitration agreements could fit into Section 337.
Moreover, the court thought the language and legislative history of
Section 337 evinced a purpose to supplement otherwise inadequate
legal remedies. Therefore, "the Commission's role in investigating
[is] unique and beyond the scope of purely private
possible violations
82
enforcement."
Section 337 allows the Commission to toll the one-year or
eighteen-month deadline for completion of an investigation when
there are pending "proceedings in a court or agency of the United
States involving similar questions concerning the subject matter of
such investigation." 3 The Farrelcourt interpreted this language as
allowing merely suspension, but not termination, when the case is
under consideration by another tribunal. The court felt that termination in deference to arbitration would lead to the absurd result of the
Commission giving "greater deference to an arbitral tribunal than [to]
a U.S. District Court."'84
The Farrel court used the language of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.85 to support its interpretation of
Section 337. It viewed Gilmer as holding that an arbitration
agreement affects an administrative tribunal and a judicial tribunal
differently. The Supreme Court's dictum that "[a]n individual ADEA
claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to file
a charge with the EEOC,"86 was taken as meaning that an "arbitration agreement operate[s] as a waiver of the right of access only to
the judicial and not the administrativeforum. 8
While in other respects the Farrelcourt used Gilmer to support
its analysis, it did not explain how its administrative-agency-versuscourt distinction would fit with the Supreme Court's holding in
Gilmer compelling arbitration of a matter before the EEOC. A
logical extension of the reasoning in Gilmer would seem to implicate
similar results when other "statutory" claims are before an administrative body, unless Congress specifically and clearly states otherwise.
The Farrelcourt's inferences from Section 337's text and legislative
history seem something less than what should be required.

82. Iaat 1155-56.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988).
949 F.2d at 1156 (quoting dissent from Mixing Devices, supra note 58, at 2).
111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991); see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653.
Farrel,949 F.2d at 1156 (emphasis in original).
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In an earlier Section 337 case, the ITC had relied heavily on
Mitsubishi when it terminated an investigation because of an
agreement to arbitrate. 88 The administrative law judge and the
Commission cited that case in their decisions to terminate the
investigation in the Farrel/Pomini dispute.89 The Farrel court
rejected this approach as a baseless extension of the Federal Arbitration Act policy favoring arbitration. To support this result, the
Federal Circuit inferred much from the language and history of
Section 337, and extracted a rule that trumps the broad judicial and
legislative policy favoring arbitration. Given that a major statute, a
significant treaty, and numerous Supreme Court decisions lie behind
this general policy, the Farrelcourt's interpretation seems questionable at best. When one looks beyond Farrel to other concerns
regarding Section 337, however, the case is even more problematic.
IV. SECTION 337 AND THE GATT: THE OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF
FARREL

In its decision in the Farrel/Pomini dispute, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio had ruled in a manner
consistent with Mitsubishi when it granted Pomini's motion to dismiss
and compel arbitration of the dispute with Farrel. 0 Thus, as the
Federal Circuit saw it, the arbitration clause that required a U.S.
district court to dismiss in deference to arbitration, could not compel
the same deference on the part of an administrative body (the ITC).
Not only is the foundation for this distinction weak, the distinction
itself ignores U.S. international obligations under the GATT.
Later, the Farrelcourt made no reference to this earlier litigation
involving the interplay of Section 337 and district court action on
intellectual property rights. If it had done so, it would have had to
address important concerns regarding differing treatment of procedural issues before a district court and the ITC. Those concerns
implicate important international obligations arising out of the GATT.
In the 1980's, Akzo N.V., a Netherlands corporation, and E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., a U.S. corporation, faced off in litigation
over patent rights to processes for the manufacture of aramid fibers
and products created with those fibers. In the United States, Du Pont

88. Fluidized Bed, supra note 56, at 7.
89. See supra notes 56, 58-60 and accompanying text.
90. Farrel Corp. v. Pomini, Inc., No. C88-2161A, slip op. at 27 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10,
1990); see Farrel,949 F.2d at 1150.
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sought exclusion of Akzo products through Section 337 proceedings. 91 The LTC found that the process used in the manufacture of
Akzo's aramid fibers abroad, if used in the U.S., would infringe Du
Pont's patent, and that the unauthorized importation of fibers
manufactured under that process had the tendency substantially to
injure the U.S. aramid fiber industry. The ITC issued an exclusion
order prohibiting the unlicensed importation of aramid fiber products
manufactured abroad by Akzo or its subsidiaries or affiliated
companies. 9 While the matter was before the ITC, the U.S. district
court in Delaware declined to exercise jurisdiction over the product
patent issues raised by the parties, finding that the ITC proceedings
93
"could very well resolve the issues presented in this case."
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC decision, rejecting
arguments that ITC procedures discriminated against foreign products
or parties on the basis of nationality, in violation of U.S. treaty
obligations . 94 Akzo responded by petitioning the European Community under the Community's "commercial policy instrument."95 The
European Commission decided to initiate panel proceedings under
article XXIII of the GATT. 96 Although Akzo and DuPont settled
their dispute, 97 the Community continued its challenge to Section
337 procedures generally, pursuing the argument that Section 337
91. See Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1475 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied 482 U.S. 909 (1987).
92. In re Certain Aramid Fiber, USITC Pub. 1824, Inv. No. 337-TA-194 (Mar. 1986).
93. Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 232 (D. Del.
1984).
94. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1485.
95. Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984 O.L (L 252) 1. This is the European equivalent
of § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (1975), as
added, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-68 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (1988)). It allows the Community, upon a petition by an industry or member state,
to initiate Commission consideration of "illicit commercial practices" by trading partners, and
ultimately to challenge those practices before the GATT on behalf of the complainant.
96. Commission Decision 87/251, 1987 O.L (L 117) 18, 21. Article XXIII is the
primary dispute settlement provision of the GATT. It requires that parties begin with
bilateral consultations in which the alleged offending party must give "sympathetic
consideration" to the representations of the complaining party. GATT, supra note 6, art.
XXII:1. If the dispute cannot be settled through these consultations, article XXIII:2 provides
for consideration of the dispute by the "CONTRACTNG PARTiES" (i.e., all parties to the
agreement acting through the GATT Council). Id art. XXIII:2. This consideration, in
practice, leads to the appointment of a panel which issues a report which then goes to the
Council for adoption on behalf of the "CONTRACTING PARTMS." Ultimately, while most
disputes end with a recommendation that the offending measure be withdrawn, other
available remedies are the authorization of compensation or retaliation. See William .
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 51, 54-60 (1987).
97. Panel Report, supra note 9, paras. 2.9 & 5.1.

1993] INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ARBITRATION: FARREL v. ITC

199

procedures violate the non-discrimination provisions of article 11/:4
of the GATT (the position rejected by the Federal Circuit in Akzo).98
The Community argued that Section 337 procedure resulted in
less favorable treatment for imported goods than for U.S. goods. The
substance of the complaint was that a U.S. plaintiff, in patent
infringement proceedings under Section 337 (available only against
imported goods) was met with more favorable procedures than under
normal patent infringement litigation in a federal district court
(available against either a domestic or a foreign defendant). Thus, a
foreign defendant in patent litigation is placed at a procedural
disadvantage relative to a U.S. defendant. The GATT panel agreed,
finding Section 337 to be inconsistent with article 11:4 of the GATT,
and issued its report on November 3, 1988. 9 The U.S. originally
blocked adoption of the report in the GATT Council, but reversed this
position, allowing adoption in November 1989."°
The GATT panel found six aspects of Section 337 procedures
that disfavor alleged patent infringers when the accused products are
imported. 01 The panel found two of these inconsistencies to be

98. Id.para. 3.1.
99. Panel Report, supra note 9, para. 6.3.
100. For a more detailed discussion of the dispute and the events leading to the Panel
Report, see Ronald A. Brand, PrivatePartiesand GATT Dispute Resolution: Implications
of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, J.WORLD TRADE, June

1990, at 5, 16-21. Various aspects of the Akzo/Du Pont dispute prior to the panel report are
discussed in Ross Denton, The New Commercial Policy Instrument and AKZO v. DuPont,
13 EUR. L. REv. 3 (1988); and in M.I.B. Arnold & M.C.EJ. Bronckers, The EEC New Trade
Policy Instrument: Some Comments on Its Application, J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1988, at 19

(updated by Bronckers in The Potential and Limitations of the Community's New Trade
Policy Instrument, conference materials for the NEw TRENDS INEC AND US TRADE LAWS

Conference at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium (14-16 Sept. 1989)); see also Grant
E. Finlayson, Rethinking the Overlapping Jurisdictionsof Section 337 and the US Courts,

J.WORLD TRADE L., Apr. 1987, at 41; Nathan G. Knight, Jr., Note, Section 337 and the
GATT A Necessary Protectionor an Unfair Trade Practice?,18 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L.
47 (1988).
101. (i) the availability to complainants of a choice of forum in which to
challenge imported products, whereas no corresponding choice is available
to challenge products of United States origin;
(ii) the potential disadvantage to producers or importers of challenged products
of foreign origin resulting from the tight and fixed time-limits in proceedings
under Section 337, when no comparable time-limits apply to producers of challenged products of United States origin;
(ii)
the non-availability of opportunities in Section 337 proceedings to raise
counterclaims, as is possible in proceedings in federal district court;
(iv) the possibility that general exclusion orders may result from proceedings
brought before the USITC under Section 337, given that no comparable remedy
is available against infringing products of United States origin;
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allowable under article XX(d) as "necessary to secure compliance"
with U.S. patent law."°2 The report requested, as to the four remaining inconsistencies, that the "United States ... bring its
procedures applied in patent infringement cases bearing on imported
products into conformity with its obligations under the General
Agreement."' 03 Two of these inconsistencies are directly implicated
by the Farreldecision. They are:
1) the choice of forum (i.e., U.S. district court or the ITC)
available in cases brought against imported products, whereas no
such choice is available in cases against domestic products, and
2) the possibility that foreign respondents may be subject to
concurrent proceedings in both of these forums.1 4
In Farrel,had Pomini been a producer of domestic goods, Farrel
would have had only one forum in which to challenge Pomini's
allegedly wrongful conduct. Normally that forum would be the
district court. When a valid arbitration agreement exists, the Federal
Arbitration Act dictates that the forum be the arbitral tribunal selected
by the parties. The decision of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio in the Farrel/Pomini dispute exemplified
this accepted judicial deference to arbitration."05

(v) the automatic enforcement of exclusion orders by the United States Customs
Service, when injunctive relief obtainable in federal court in respect of infringing
products of United States origin requires for its enforcement individual
proceedings brought by the successful plaintiff;
(vi) the possibility that producers or importers of challenged products of foreign
origin may have to defend their products both before the USITC and in federal
district court, whereas no corresponding exposure exists with respect to products
of United States origin.
Panel Report, supra note 9, para. 5.20.
102. Id. paras. 5.30-.33.
103. Id para. 6.4.
104. Id. para. 5.20(i), (vi). U.S. antidumping procedures would at first appear to be
subject to similar objections. Foreign products may be the subject of either antidumping
actions before the 1TC and the Commerce Department or antitrust (predatory-pricing) actions
in federal district court. Similar conduct involving domestic goods may be challenged only
in court under the antitrust laws. However, the procedures applied in antidumping cases are
specifically authorized in the GATT system through article VI of the GAT and the Tokyo
Round Antidumping Code. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in GAT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECrED DOCUMENTS
171-84 (26th Supp. 1980); see GATr, supra note 6, art. VI. Thus, national antidumping
procedures can be justified under article XX(d) of the GAT as measures "necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the Provisions
of' the GAT. GATr, supra note 6, art. XX(d).
105. Farrel Corp. v. Pomini, Inc., No. C88-2161A (N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 1990).
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When a producer or importer of a foreign product is involved,
however, the U.S. complainant may file either in the district court or
with the ITC under Section 337. When an arbitration clause exists,
the court will defer to arbitration, as did the district court in Farrel.
Unless the ITC similarly defers, however, the maker or importer of
the foreign goods may have to defend in two forums (i.e. the agency
and arbitration). The GAIT Council condemned these procedural
features as defective in the Section 337 panel report. The Farrel
court's decision that proceedings must properly continue in both
arbitration and before the ITC clearly contradicts the GAT Council's
finding.
The GAIT panel report is wholly consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions from The Bremen through Mitsubishi,
which recognized the need for predictability in determining the
dispute resolution mechanism in international commercial relations.
The judicial versus administrative tribunal distinction developed in
Farrelexacerbates already existing problems of U.S. compliance with
GAIT obligations. When an arbitration agreement exists, a U.S.
complainant thus has a choice of forums (ITC or arbitration) in which
to assert intellectual property claims against a foreign defendant, and
may, in fact, elect to proceed in both forums. Substantively identical
claims involving domestic goods are strictly directed toward arbitration. These are the very types of discrimination the panel report
concluded violated the GATT.
Farrelalso raises concern about the court's failure to consider
rules of statutory construction that conflict with its result. The court
latched onto the word "shall" in Section 337(b)(1), proclaiming that
it is "the language of command,"'6 and that where "the directions
of a statute are mandatory, then strict compliance with the statutory
terms is essential to the validity of the administrative action."' 7
The court failed even to consider the coexisting rule of statutory
construction that, "[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is
to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an
international agreement of the United States."' ' This latter rule is
supported by language of the Supreme Court saying that "an Act of

106. 949 F.2d at 1153 (quoting Ass'n of Am. R.R. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)).
107. 949 F.2d at 1153 (quoting SINGER, supra note 64, § 4.18).
108. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 114.
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Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains."1"
V.

CONCLUSION

While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has the
status of an executive agreement in U.S. law, and never received the
formal advice and consent of the Senate,10 it is generally agreed
that it constitutes a treaty obligation binding upon the United
States. 11 It is true that a later statute will supersede a prior treaty
obligation when the two conflict.1 1 2 However, "[w]hen the [treaty
and statute] relate to the same subject, the courts will always
endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
113 both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either."'
The rule of statutory construction requiring respect for international obligations has the support of numerous Supreme Court
decisions, and should not be lightly disregarded. The Farrelcourt's
failure even to mention it in the adoption of a contrary rule of
construction is a serious oversight and raises questions about the
resulting holding. While Congress certainly could choose to exclude
consideration of U.S. commitments to GATT in the application of
Section 337, it is unlikely that such a choice has been made silently.
Section 337 is a part of U.S. international trade law, all of which is
significantly interrelated with the GATT multilateral trading system.
Congress could also choose to override its policy favoring
arbitration by barring the ITC from terminating a Section 337
proceeding in the face of an arbitration agreement. However, without
more explicit statutory text or legislative history on this issue than

109. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
110. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
111. See Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law, 26 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 479, 493-502 (1990); Robert E.
Hudec, The Legal Status of GA7T in the Domestic Law of the United States, in THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY AND GATT 187 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986); John H. Jackson,
The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L.
REv. 249, 312 (1967); Note, United States Participationin the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 61 COLtM. L. REV. 505, 510-11 (1961).
112. The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict, is not settled
by the Constitution. But the question is not involved in any doubt as to
its proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and
an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870) (footnotes omitted).
113. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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was cited by the Federal Circuit in Farrel,assuming such a choice in
the face of the doctrine favoring statute-treaty consistency was taking
a rather substantial leap.
The Farrelcourt chose the very result least consistent with U.S.
international obligations contained in both the New York Convention
and in the GATT. In doing so it should have explicitly held that the
rule of statutory construction favoring compatibility with an international agreement either did not apply, or was overridden by a
countervailing authority. The court made no such explicit determination. Instead, the decision demonstrates an insouciance toward
international obligations all too often present in U.S. jurisprudence.

